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Abstract 
Facial recognition software is something we every day, whether it’s a suggested tag on 
our Facebook post or a faster way to unlock our phones. As technology becomes increasingly 
pervasive in our lives, law enforcement has adapted to utilize the new tools available in 
accessory to their investigations and the legal process. In a perfect world where facial 
recognition was reliable one hundred percent of the time, this new software would only face a 
constitutional and moral debate of when, or whether it can at all be used. Unfortunately, this 
technology is still fairly new and already there are cases of inaccurate results due to algorithmic 
errors, amongst other inaccuracies such as the ability to read the faces of certain races, mainly 
African Americans, less reliably than others. Due to the issues of accuracy and debates around 
privacy, many cities have opted not to use the technology. There are concerns that facial 
recognition software may violate individuals’ civil rights by providing false positive 
identifications and leading to wrongful arrests.  
 This purpose of this research is to analyze cities whose law enforcement departments are 
using facial recognition software in comparison to those that are not, to trace a pattern of 
potential dangers of using facial recognition software in the context of law enforcement. The 
technology is fairly recent so there is not much data on the widespread use or aversion to it. This 
paper seeks to gather information that is currently available about the use of facial recognition 
software being used by law enforcement in the United States and compile it into one 
comprehensive analysis.  
 
Keywords:  facial recognition software, facial recognition technology, open-source 
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Law Enforcement’s Use of Facial Recognition Software in United States Cities 
As technology expands and is further developed each year, we are continuously faced 
with the question of whether it is appropriate, legal or productive for law enforcement to be able 
to access and make use of these advances. The development of facial recognition software is no 
exception. Imperfections or flaws with an otherwise promising technological advancement could 
have dire consequences if they are not corrected before law enforcement utilizes the technology. 
The work that officers do has a direct and often dramatic impact on the individuals they cross 
paths with through investigations, inquiries or arrests. As with any tool utilized by law 
enforcement, there are numerous possibilities for regulating or restricting it in varying degrees. 
Many cities in the United States have chosen to ban law enforcement’s use of the technology 
entirely, while others have sought to create policies within their police department to outline 
proper use of the technology. These regulations must be dependent also upon how law 
enforcement seeks to use facial recognition technology.  
The potential applications of facial recognition software’s use by police officers range 
greatly. The technology could be used similarly to a fingerprint scan, where existing image or 
video captured of someone committing a crime is used to scan through a facial database of mug 
shots to identify if someone who has previously committed a crime is involved in their current 
case. It could also be used as a tool of surveillance, verifying a suspect’s whereabouts and 
movement through the use of public and business cameras. It could even be used to find an 
individual if that same video of someone committing a crime is applied to local public cameras 
and video feeds rather than a database of mug shots.  
Questions of privacy rights will undoubtably arise due to the nature of facial recognition. 
In order to complete a facial recognition scan there must first be a captured image to try to 
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match, as well as a database or video to search for a match within. As we move into unchartered 
technological waters, the choices we make will create a precedent for future advancements. 
Future privacy and legal decisions about the ways in which city governments and law 
enforcement departments may seek the use of newly developed technological advances will be 
based on the policies and laws that are created to restrict or outline proper practices for law 
enforcement’s use of facial recognition software.  
In this thesis I will analyze facial recognition software as it is used by law enforcement 
agencies in the United States. I will examine six cities as case studies, three of which utilize 
facial recognition software and three that have banned law enforcement’s use of facial 
recognition software. Using these case studies, I will draw a conclusion about the current use or 
banning of facial recognition software, as well as form a summary of issues that United States 
law enforcement should consider and prioritize in relation to facial recognition software moving 
forward. A brief definition of key terms will follow to outline the basic terminology used 
throughout the course of this thesis. 
Definition of Keywords: 
Facial recognition software is used in this paper to reference specific programs used by 
law enforcement. Facial recognition technology is defined in this project as a broader category 
of facial recognition software, made up of the many facial recognition programs available. 
Programs that are “open-source” publish their source code online for other developers and the 
general public to see and access. This allows a larger group of individuals to use or suggest 
changes to be made to the program. Building off of the use of these terms, broader concepts will 
be explored in the following sections of this thesis.  
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Literature Review 
How It Works 
 Facial recognition software is designed on the principle of face matching. In face 
matching the subject being tested, whether that be a machine or a human, is presented with two 
faces at the same time and asked whether they match without relying on the subject’s memory at 
all. This differs from face recognition, where the subject would be presented with one face to 
learn and then separately shown a series of other faces and asked whether they are the same or 
not without having the two side by side to compare (Stacchi, Huguenin-Elie, Caldara & Ramon, 
2020). A face is made up of several standard identifiers. These help a person, or a computer 
recognize that what they are seeing is a face in the first place. From there each identifier has a 
slight variation between different individual’s faces. A nose could be long, short, hooked, or 
upturned. Lips can be full or shallow, close to the nose or far away. Facial recognition software 
tries to measure these different variations in facial features in order to match one face to another.  
 Humans have been matching faces for decades in law enforcement. In general humans 
have a better memory for faces than events and a faster recall for them as well. Facial matching 
is not something that can be taught or learned with practice, however, there is a percentage of the 
population that recognizes and can match faces with a greater accuracy than average. In fact, 
these “‘super recognizers’ perform at well above normal levels on tests of unfamiliar face 
matching, with degraded as well as high quality images” (Robertson, Noyes, Dowsett, Jenkins & 
Burton, 2016). 
Each individual facial recognition software’s algorithm is likely different, but the basic steps 
the program follows would be similar to the five steps outlined in the article “How Facial 
Recognition Systems Work” by Kevin Bonsor and Ryan Johnson. The steps are Detection, 
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Alignment, Normalization, Representation, and Matching. In the first step the program tries to 
find something that is a face, looking for the basic shapes and features that it has learned make 
up a face from its training data. Once it finds a face, it moves on to alignment. This is the process 
of determining the head’s position, size and pose. A face needs to be turned at least thirty-five 
degrees toward the camera for the software to be able to recognize it as a face (Bonsor & 
Johnson, 2001). Once the image is aligned properly, an image of the head goes through the 
process of normalization, where it is rotated and scaled into the proper position to be read and 
measured by the program. From there the data of the measurements and location of facial 
features are translated into a unique code. This process is called representation, and it allows the 
stored facial data and the newly acquired facial data to be compared more easily. The last step is 
where the matching occurs. During this matching step, the new facial data is compared to the 
stored data to determine if a match exists.  
  In some places, law enforcement is already using facial recognition software. In 2018 
Department of Public Safety Officials in Utah applied facial recognition software the state’s 
driver licenses databases. Using the technology officials found several state-issued license IDs 
that were created with false information. These IDs allowed minors to take part in “age restricted 
activities … and individuals [to apply] for lines of credit with someone else’s information” (Salt 
Lake Tribune 2018). The Chicago police department has entered into a two-year contract with 
Clearview, a facial recognition software company, to use the software in criminal investigations. 
The CPD states that the technology is not used for surveillance or “keeping tabs on protestors,” 
but rather it can only be used “in conjunction with an active criminal investigation” (Schuba 
2020). In practice, the Chicago police department says that Facial recognition Software allows 
police to find a lead or narrow down a lead when all that they have to go off of is a photo. Detroit 
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also uses the technology after passing a policy that only allows “facial recognition to be used on 
still images of people suspected of violent crimes or home invasion” (Cwiek 2019).  
Flaws in the Technology  
While this software is used by law enforcement across the United States, there are some 
flaws that have already arisen. One such problem is a result of the “other race” effect. The other 
race effect is an effect that was recorded throughout psychological research that “indicates that 
humans recognize the faces of their own race more accurately than faces of other races” 
(Phillips, Jiang, Narvekar, Ayyad & Otoole, 2010). Statistically, humans struggle to match or 
compare faces of races other than their own, but they still perform better than computers do with 
matching or distinguishing faces of other races. Computers preform with the same bias to 
recognize faces of their native race better than foreign races. These biases are amplified, 
however, due to the algorithms written into the software. The process for how the computer sees 
and compares faces, is created by humans and therefore it is possible for biases to be introduced 
into the code itself. Further, in cases where the software learns what markers make up a face 
through training data, bias can be introduced if the human supplied training data is not diverse. 
The software developed in one region may be somewhat reliable in matching faces native to that 
region, but it is likely that it will not perform as well when faced with a foreign face. This is 
because the software was developed to recognize features outlined by humans from that region 
and was likely fed test images of native faces as well. 
Facial recognition algorithms can be tested for the other race effect. Algorithms are often 
given a series of faces as training data. These faces and the races represented in them may allow 
the algorithm to be better equipped to recognize one race over another in the same way that 
human infants begin learning faces they frequently encounter, usually their own race, and don’t 
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recognize faces of other races as easily (Phillips, Jiang, Narvekar, Ayyad & Otoole, 2010). As 
with any new technology or software, there is the probability of human error interfering and 
causing a technical error in the performance of the software. This is because the software can 
only make decisions, for example whether a face is the same as the face in another image or not, 
as well as it is instructed to by the humans creating it. “The engineer that develops an algorithm 
may program it to focus on facial features that are more easily distinguishable in some races than 
others” (Garvie, 2016). This could be entirely unintentional on the engineer’s part but is nearly 
unavoidable. Whether the influence comes from the test data fed to the software or from the 
process it uses to take in the data of each face, there are infinitely many places where human 
influence on the algorithm could influence it to make a biased decision or to have sub-par 
performance when attempting to match faces of other races than its native race.  
There has been research into the effect of different algorithm’s ability to read faces at 
different angles and in different lighting and weather. There also have been a limited number of 
studies focusing on an algorithm’s performance in its home area versus in other racial areas and 
settings but testing for the other race effect has not been considered as thoroughly. (Phillips, 
Jiang, Narvekar, Ayyad & Otoole, 2010).  
Legislation & Interpretation 
Just as facial recognition software is currently developing and growing in use, legislation 
around the use of facial recognition software and technology is in an equally changing state. One 
such piece of legislation that is currently in development is the Facial Recognition Technology 
Warrant Act of 2019. This act has only been introduced and then referred to the Committee on 
the Judiciary.  
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Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act. 
The Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act seeks “to limit the use of facial 
recognition technology by Federal agencies, and for other purposes” (Facial Recognition 
Technology Warrant Act of 2019). It proposes to do this by requiring law enforcement to gain 
similar permissions before using facial recognition software in an investigation to what would be 
required of a physical search, a warrant. If passed, this “rule would apply to any surveillance 
activities lasting more than 72 hours” (Corrigan 2019). In the language of the bill there are some 
proposed situations where the law enforcement officers would be able to forgo this requirement 
as well if they are able to prove probable cause.  
In this case the officer could use the software without a search warrant if they determine 
that there are “exigent circumstances” that would require the use of the software more 
immediately than obtaining a warrant would allow. In order to use the software, they would also 
need to determine that a judge would grant a warrant if the officer did present the current 
circumstance to them. Then the officer would be required to gain a warrant within forty-eight 
hours in order to “engage in ongoing surveillance” (Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act 
of 2019). Ongoing surveillance, according to an article about the bill written by Jack Corrigan in 
2019, is defined as circumstances where an individual is surveilled using facial recognition 
software for more that seventy-two hours either in real time or by digitally going through data 
that had previously covered more than seventy-two hours.  
 It is important to consider the repercussions of not having a system in place to limit and 
regulate law enforcement’s use of facial recognition software. While the goal of law enforcement 
as an establishment has been conceptualized as a means to protect the public, in reality, specific 
law enforcement agencies may suggest and encourage that the role of law enforcement is to stop 
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crime and catch “bad guys.” The difference is that of a due process or crime control model of 
policing.  
A due process model values the public’s rights and privacy as outlined by the constitution 
by placing limitations on law enforcement and the state in order to keep their powers from 
becoming excessive. In a due process model, it is most important for law enforcement to follow 
proper procedure (i.e., Getting warrants and having sufficient evidence to do so) before invading 
an individual’s personal privacy. These procedures create a clear outline for police to follow to 
protect the public’s civil rights. By specifying under what circumstances an officer must get a 
warrant the court is able to define which police actions would be in violation of the public’s 
rights without a warrant. This ensures that civil rights are respected. 
In contrast, a crime control model values just that, controlling and stopping crime. This 
model is more ought to overstep some privacy boundaries and follow a jump first ask questions 
later mentality. A crime control model focuses and puts so much value on catching criminals that 
there is a perspective change that occurs in law enforcement officials. This perspective change 
between protecting the public, and by extension their rights, or catching law breakers to reduce 
crime overall, is key. If the role of law enforcement is protection, as it is in a due process model, 
then it can be assumed that most people are innocent citizens who are to be protected. If the role 
of law enforcement is to stop wrong doers, as it is in a crime control model, then an officer’s job 
becomes searching for criminals and finding them amongst the public. This means that they may 
view all individuals as guilty until proven innocent instead of the more appropriate innocent until 
proven guilty.  
  This change in mindset is important to keep in mind when considering how facial 
recognition software could be potentially used by law enforcement officers. There is always the 
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chance that, while having the right intentions, law enforcement officers my use facial recognition 
software in a way that does not respect and preserve the rights owed to all citizens as stated by 
the constitution. In their haste to protect the public from, or to catch, someone that is perceived 
by officers to be a threat, the rights of that individual could be forgotten. As a society we may be 
quick to say that we do not care about those who would be categorized as a perceived threat or as 
having the potential to break laws. It would be wrong to make this assumption, however, because 
upon considering the types of individuals coming under this scrutiny— political activists, social 
activists, individuals attending protests— it becomes increasingly likely that you either are, or 
know someone who is, in one of these categories when it comes to one area of their life or 
another. In that case you, your friends, your coworkers, or family members may be tracked and 
surveilled using this technology without any restriction. This would be due to an action, on your 
part, that you would view as a basic right owed to you as a citizen of the United States.  
A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy. 
Drawing on the well know case of Katz, the debate becomes whether we have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to our faces. The supreme court has argued that 
you cannot expect that your face or person would not be observed within a public space, 
however, it was decided in the case of Katz that “the fourth amendment protects people, not 
places” (Katz v. United States. (n.d.)). To that end surveillance drones are allowed to record and 
scan a public area from one hundred feet away. It is not assumed that our faces can reasonably be 
kept private because of the space we are in, as well as the fact that the details of our appearance 
are visibly on display wherever we go. Overtime the presence of cameras around us has steadily 
become a normal part of our daily lives. There are cameras on our phones, in our stores, on our 
traffic lights, in parking garages, inside and outside of apartment buildings, and in and around 
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our city government buildings. Facial recognition software has grown out of the new societal 
norm where cameras record us in our daily movements, for the most part without our notice. This 
presence creates a wealth of data for technology like facial recognition software to utilize.  
While our faces may not be kept private while in public spaces, it is the information that a 
scan of our faces would supply that is concerning many people. Any passerby may be able to see 
your face when you’re walking down the street. They cannot tell, however, how old you are, 
where you live, work and go to school. Facial recognition software allows us this possibility 
when it matches our face to a database of information. “Under Katz, an expectation of privacy is 
not reasonable if the information at issue was "knowingly expose[d] to the public”” (Hirose, 
2017). It might be assumed that this interpretation would protect the public from unknowing 
scans of their face. The information that would be gleaned from such a scan can be very personal 
in nature and is not “knowingly exposed to the public” through the act of showing your face in 
public. This too is allowed and legal, however, because the supreme court argues that the same 
information that is provided by a facial recognition search could be gleaned by an officer’s in-
person surveillance of an individual paired with a manual search through database records.  
Arguments Supporting warrantless use of facial recognition software compare the 
technology to a license plate look up. The glaring difference between the two, however, is the 
nature of the thing being recorded scanned and matched against a database of information. 
License plates, while publicly displayed are, by nature, meant to identify and record personal 
information. The owner of the plates knowingly registers them with the government and is aware 
that their record will be recorded under the plate numbers (Hirose, 2017). Individuals do not self-
register their faces with the government in a similar way. They also do not operate under the 
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assumption that their face carries with it a record of personal information throughout their daily 
travels in public spaces.  
Hirose, writing for the Connecticut Law Review, observes that people may not expect 
that their appearance and physical actions are kept private when they are in a public space. They 
do expect, however, that their personal information is kept private. It makes sense that one would 
assume that personal details such as an individual’s address, age, income, and career are kept 
private when moving about in public spaces. Facial recognition technology, Hirose argues, acts 
against this expectation of privacy because, when applied to a database of information, a scan 
and match of an individual’s facial features could reveal all this personal information. 
Fundamental Values of Democracy. 
When discussing constitutionality, the when and where of facial recognition software’s 
application matters. Facial recognition software could restrict or interfere with more than one of 
the fundamental values of democracy as they are protected by the bill of rights. Outside of the 
fourth amendment, which is largely concerned with investigative searches, some of the 
fundamental democratic values at risk of being interfered with are freedom of speech in 
reference to the right to anonymous speech, and freedom of movement. These are integral rights 
that make up the foundation of our liberties outlined by the United States Constitution. The 
reason that freedom of speech and the freedom of movement are prioritized so highly is that they 
not only are important to us on a personal level, but also democratically. These foundational 
rights allow for us to interact with the government, law enforcement and each other in a way that 
fundamentally supports civil democratic society. If these rights are ignored or lost, the basic 
principles of our society will fail and crumble.  
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Protests throughout Hong Kong of late are plagued by a steady change in policing in their 
area. “Many protesters now cover their faces, and they fear that the police are using cameras and 
possibly other tools to single out targets for arrest” (Mozur, 2019). Facial recognition software 
and video surveillance are being used increasingly in a similar fashion to the way in which these 
tools are utilized in China. As police have begun to pair this surveillance with the act of 
concealing their identity as law enforcement agents’ tension is rising (Mozur, 2019).  Protesters 
are tracked using video surveillance of protests and activist are tracked down based on this 
information.  
It is not a far reach to imagine that facial recognition software could be misused in the 
United States similarly. The fear that law enforcement might use facial recognition software to 
track protesters and activists, like they do in China and have begun to do in Hong Kong, is not 
unfounded. These countries can be categorized under a crime control model. Law enforcement 
agencies in the US that do already use facial recognition software use it to track individuals and 
place them at specific locations at certain times. These actions imply a crime control model as 
well. Officer’s want to keep track of “potential risks” in order to prevent crime. This intention of 
risk prevention, however, is the very thing that pushes United States policing from a due process 
model, as intended, to a crime control model.  
If we believe that individuals are innocent until proven guilty, then we do not need to 
keep an eye on people who exercise their freedom of speech. A due process model of policing 
assumes that these individuals will act appropriately and legally within their rights. In the event 
that someone does break or cross any laws or legal restrictions police investigation, with or 
without facial recognition software, may be warranted. The technology has been designed to find 
individuals based only on their face, so it can easily be used to find and track down individuals 
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that have been caught on tape at a protest or seen leaving a meeting place or known frequented 
location of activists or protestors. This kind of usage goes against the very foundation of our 
rights as citizens of the United States of America as defined in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  
Right to Anonymous Speech.  
The first Amendment of the Bill of Rights states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const. amend. I). Hirose brings up the 
concern that the application of facial recognition software on crowds during protests and rallies 
could interfere with this right. The use of this technology could be used to dissuade individuals 
from exercising their right to free speech and peaceful assembly (Hirose, 2017).  
Their identities, in theory, would be recorded and could be used against them simply by 
attending to show their support or interest. If a law were to be made allowing law enforcement 
agencies to use facial recognition software in these instances, it would allow officers to not only 
know who is in attendance at these events, but also to gather a record of information of the 
individual were to attend multiple events like this. This data could be used to the ends of building 
a case against an individual that they are a political radical, when in fact they may only be 
passionate about a civil rights movement and acting within their legal rights. The officer would 
also have access to many of the individual’s personal details which, if revealed, could cause 
issues or threaten the individual’s career and personal relations.  
Freedom of Movement.  
There is also the potential for facial recognition technology to be applied to public area 
and used as a tool for mass surveillance by law enforcement. In this way, when tracking a 
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suspect or just in the gathering of data for a searchable database, it would be possible to create a 
record of where an individual travels each day, public places they frequent, or a list of 
individuals entering a certain area. Hirose alludes to the potential for this type of surveillance to 
impede the free movement of individuals as they would effectively be tailed wherever they 
traveled, and this data would be accessible at any point in history after its implementation 
(Hirose, 2017).  
Methods 
This project will used mixed social methods common to legal analysis. In particular, the 
project will primarily rely on case studies of how differing law enforcement institutions use 
facial recognition technology. Case study methodologies have long been used in qualitative 
social science projects to analyze law and policy. Case studies “involve the nonstatistical 
comparative analysis of a small number of cases…the study of two or more instances of a well-
specified phenomenon that resemble each other” (George & Bennet, 2005, pg. 151). George and 
Bennet outline the case study method as a useful way of determining and evaluating the factors 
that shape legal and policy outcomes.  
The cases analyzed in this project will include a total of six cities where facial 
recognition software’s use by law enforcement is either accepted, banned, or a topic of 
controversy. They are Salt Lake City, New York, Detroit, Somerville, San Francisco, and 
Cambridge.  
Case study methods allow the comparison of policies with attention to their similarities 
and differences. Drawing from Yin’s (2012) Applications of Case Study Research, this project 
will compare eight cases by identifying core factors shaping the development and use of facial 
recognition technology. Cases will be analyzed for concerns about privacy, false positives, biased 
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algorithms, and other factors that are of concern for departments considering facial recognition 
technology.  
Data on each case’s use of facial recognition software will be obtained from news 
sources, government documents (when available), and interest group and nonprofit reports on the 
use of the technology. Many departments do not make their formal facial recognition technology 
policy information available to the public directly, but information about the use of the 
technology appears in media reports and reports from relevant non-profit agencies such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 
As facial recognition technology is a fairly recent development there is not a wealth of 
prior research on the topic to draw upon. Facial recognition software and its use by law 
enforcement is a developing subject and therefore, data is limited and in a nearly constant state 
of change. This project seeks to compile currently available data as well analyze both theoretical 
and practical advancements and obstacles as they occur.  
Case Studies 
Salt Lake City 
In Utah, Salt Lake City started using facial recognition software in 2008. Before this, 
“people were able to apply for and obtain a valid, government issued identification card under a 
false name or birth date” (Wood, 2019). The concern at the time was that this meant that people 
were able to apply for credit and financing under false credentials and underage minors were 
able to take part in age-restricted activities. Using facial recognition software, city officials 
planned to scan the database when an individual applies for a license in order to verify that there 
are no other licenses given already to that same person. To confirm this, the software would need 
a photo of the individual applying for the ID and have access to the state’s database of licenses to 
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scan their images and check for a match to the new applicant. If there are no matches the 
application goes through as usual and the person receives their license following the usual course 
of action. If there is a match found in the system, however, the application would be rejected 
thereby preventing citizens from applying for a second license under false credentials.  
Using facial recognition software as a new tool also allowed “immigration and law 
enforcement officials to pore through all Utah driver license photos to identify criminals, 
witnesses or others of interest” (Wood 2019). The ability to apply facial recognition software on 
the database of driver’s licenses has been the center of dispute for the past few years in Utah. 
Privacy concerns are the center of this debate as law makers argue that access to the database of 
driver’s licenses effectively puts every registered resident under police scrutiny as a potential 
criminal without their knowledge or consent. There has been no legislature created to limit or 
control the way in which officials are permitted to utilize the facial recognition software in the 
state of Utah.  
New York 
The New York City Police Department has been using facial recognition software since 
2011. While no legislation has been created or proposed in the area, the New York City Police 
Department made the first policy in association with facial recognition technology after almost a 
decade of using it (Agrawal, 2020). The policy outlines a four-step procedure for New York 
police officers to follow when using facial recognition software as part of their investigation. The 
steps are as follows: the investigator submits a request to the Real Time Crime Center, the 
request is approved, an officer of the Real Time Crime Center runs the image against a database 
containing only arrest and parole photograph, and finally the officer sends the report to the case 
investigator. The center compiles and has access to New York State criminal, parole, and 
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probation records, New York City criminal complaints, emergency calls and summonses, 
national crime report records and public records. The goal of the Real Time Crime center is to 
create “a centralized data hub that rapidly mines information from multiple crime databases and 
disseminates that information to officers in the field” (New York City Global Partners, 2010). 
Facial recognition software used by the New York Police Department would have access to these 
databases.  
While a policy that seeks to manage law enforcement’s use of facial recognition software 
is a good idea upon inception, there have been some concerns that the procedure outlined by the 
New York Police Department is not a sound procedure and could be weak to corruption and 
misuse. Methods of oversight or disciplinary actions for the policy are not outlined in the press 
release or public records (New York City Police Department, 2020). Critiques have said that 
facial recognition software has “limited effectiveness” because matches are not always accurate 
and need to be verified by an officer (Agrawal, 2020).  
While method may be better than relying solely on the software, it does not account for 
human bias. In order to confirm the software’s results a human, who is susceptible to biases and 
human error, must look through the leads offered by the computer. This introduction of human 
influence could lead to further false identifications or accusations. There also has been 
speculation that it is not clear who can request to use the can request to use facial recognition 
software through this process and also that there is unclear phrasing as to the scope of the 
database, state or city, that officers will have access to (Agrawal, 2020).  
Detroit 
 Detroit’s law enforcement has been using facial recognition software since 2017 (Rahal 
& Ferretti, 2017). In September of 2019, Detroit’s Board of Public Commissioners voted to 
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approve an update to their policy for the use of facial recognition software. The Detroit Police 
Department’s previous policy regarding facial recognition software had allowed for more 
extensive use of the technology, including live scans using facial recognition on public areas in 
the event of a terrorism threat. Under the new policy, requests to use the technology must be 
submitted to the Crime Intelligence Unit to be reviewed and either approved or denied (Detroit 
P.D. manual, 2019). The new policy also outlined punishments for officers who misuse the 
technology. In the new section of Detroit’s Police Department manual there is a section titled 
“Discipline” which states that suspected violations to the facial recognition policy will be 
reported within twenty-four hours of the violation. The suspected “misuse of facial recognition 
software will be investigated and reviewed for criminality” and officers found guilty of violating 
the policy will be dismissed from the Detroit Police Department (Detroit P.D. manual, 2019).  
Detroit’s city council voted to approve a proposal that would renew the city’s contract 
with Dataworks Plus, the company that creates and supplies the facial recognition technology 
used by Detroit law enforcement, from October 1, 2020 to September 30, 2022 (Ferretti & Rahal, 
2020). In the past years, there has been public debate and protest expressing Detroit residents’ 
dissatisfaction with law enforcement’s use of facial recognition software. Most recently, was a 
protest this fall in September of 2020. In this protest “members of the Detroit Will Breathe 
coalition led a 10-car caravan protest over facial recognition through the city's East English 
Village neighborhood” (Ferretti & Rahal, 2020). Protesters criticized the racial bias of facial 
recognition software.  
Somerville 
In Somerville, the tone towards facial recognition technology is equally critical. 
Residents and city officials worry that the technology’s function and abilities are developing at a 
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faster pace than the public can comprehend. In 2019, the Somerville City Council voted 
unanimously to ban law enforcement and local government’s use of facial recognition software. 
With this decision, “Somerville became the first community on the East Coast to ban 
government use of face surveillance technology” (Lannan, 2019). In a Boston Globe article by 
Sarah Wu, Somerville City Councilor Ben Ewen-Campen mused that many residents of 
Somerville work in STEM and technology fields and are more familiar with the technology than 
other cities and communities might be and are more conscious of the need to regulate its use.  
Law enforcement officials in Somerville worry that bans on facial recognition technology 
“could impede police departments’ efforts to maintain public safety” (Wu, 2019). Law 
enforcement officials and police officers are more likely to assume the technology will be used 
appropriately. This is because, as officers of the law, they do not view themselves as likely to 
misuse the technology and extend this assumption to all officers.  
Cambridge 
 Following Summerville’s decision to ban facial recognition software in 
September of 2020, Cambridge, Massachusetts’s “City Council unanimously approved [a] 
measure, prohibiting any city departments from intentionally accessing or using face recognition 
technology — as well as any information obtained from such technology” (DeCosta-Klipa, 
2020). Amongst the city departments included in the ban was the city’s law enforcement 
department. Prior to this vote, Cambridge officials were permitted to use facial recognition 
software as long as they had first gained the City Council’s approval. City Councilor Marc 
McGovern pointed to other cities in the United States using facial recognition as evidence that 
Cambridge should ban the technology (Geller, 2020). Being a more technologically conscious 
community, Cambridge is also more ought to keep up with the ways in which advances in 
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technology are being used or misused elsewhere. This is evident as the push to ban facial 
recognition in Cambridge became more insistent after an example of the technology being 
misused was clearly seen in the way “the Chinese government [used] it to target protesters in 
Hong Kong” (Geller, 2020).  
Notably, Cambridge City Council officials clearly state that it was not a question of their 
law enforcement’s morals or ability that led to the ban, but rather the examples of facial 
recognition software being misused elsewhere. The concern in Cambridge is not that their law 
enforcement will misuse the technology, but that the technology itself has the potential to be 
flawed. Seeing facial recognition misused in other areas was enough, in this case, for officials to 
unanimously vote to ban the technology. As of 2019, a poll by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) showed that ninety percent of Massachusetts “voters think the state should 
regulate government use of face surveillance technology, and 79% support a moratorium until 
the state does” (Szaniszlo, 2019). Following this logic, Cambridge too seeks to ban facial 
recognition software in its early phase in response to evidence of flaws in the software and 
misuse in other areas.  
San Francisco 
San Francisco was the first city in the United States to ban the use of facial recognition 
software. The act bans city officials and police from using facial recognition technology and also 
requires any future use of the technology to be approved by the city council (Lee, 2019). Law 
enforcement officials in San Francisco expressed concerns that the ban will prevent the city from 
ever using facial recognition, even when the technology is more developed and less flawed. The 
language in the “ban forbids city departments from buying or using facial-recognition technology 
for any purpose” (Metz, 2019). The ACLU of Northern California, however, commended San 
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Francisco on its decision. San Francisco’s decision to ban law enforcement’s use of facial 
recognition software was ultimately based upon the failings of several popular facial surveillance 
systems. In general, facial recognition technology has proven to be inaccurate when attempting 
to match female or African American faces. The ACLU warns that without some form of 
structure and oversight, “the technology could easily be misused to surveil immigrants or 
unfairly target African-Americans or low-income neighborhoods” (Conger, Fausset, & 
Kovaleski, 2019).  
Analysis & Discussion 
Fundamentals of Facial Recognition  
With today’s wealth of online knowledge and resources, it is not difficult to find articles 
detailing the basic principles that facial recognition technology must follow in order to find and 
determine a match between a given image and a database of faces. This base knowledge can help 
the general public become more familiar with the technology and its limitations as law 
enforcement’s use of facial recognition software increasingly becomes a topic of discussion in 
the United States. Overtime, an increased transparency of facial recognition software’s accuracy 
and its blind spots could only improve the public’s understanding of what they are agreeing to 
when they allow their law enforcement to use facial recognition software without regulation.  
The way in which future facial recognition technology is developed also will affect the 
resulting software that is produced. There are currently a series of larger companies developing 
facial recognition software. There are also a series of free open-source facial recognition 
programs (Miller 2020). Programs that are “open-source” publish their source code online for 
other developers and the general public to see and access. This allows a larger group of 
individuals to use or suggest changes to be made to the program.  
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One example of an open-source facial recognition software is “OpenFace” (OpenFace – 
Home, n.d.). OpenFace’s website is directly linked to GitHub, allowing anyone with a free 
account to access and suggest changes to its code. Open-source facial recognition software may 
benefit from this variety if developers are conscious of the need to minimize racial bias within 
the system. Being open source would allow a greater number of culturally different individuals to 
work on the project with ease. In contrast, private companies that do not share their source code 
will need to concern themselves with diversity in their team as well as in their code.  
Flaws in the Technology & its Algorithms 
The most concerning aspect of facial recognition software is its relatively new age. 
“Facial recognition technology was first developed in the mid-1960s” (Kahn, 2019). Any 
technology is bound to have flaws in its first iterations. It is not common, however, for law 
enforcement to seek use of relatively new technology without proper testing and proof of 
reliability. “The law, as is usual in the field of privacy and emerging technologies, is lagging 
behind-no clear set of constitutional rules constrains law enforcement's use of this powerful 
technology” which, with a lack of testing and oversight, may actually exacerbate the issue and its 
ability to do harm (Hirose, 2017).  
In a brief TED talk, MIT grad student Joy Buolamwini describes her first-hand 
experience with facial recognition software’s shortcomings. Joy first encountered facial 
recognition when working on an assignment for school. She needed to use technology that 
recognizes a face in order for her project to work, but when Joy stepped in front of the webcam 
the software could not detect her face. At first, she simply borrowed one of her friends to help 
her complete her assignment and assumed that the problem would be fixed by someone else. On 
a study abroad trip later in her education, however, Joy encountered this problem again. The 
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same free facial recognition software she had used in her assignment was being used in a 
demonstration in an entirely different country (Buolamwini, 2016).  
That was in 2016, now, in 2020 the same flaws are still a huge problem in facial 
recognition technology. Seeing these issues with facial recognition software’s racial bias in and 
outside of law enforcement was one of the reasons Cambridge officials decided to ban the 
technology from the start (Geller, 2020). Facial recognition technology works with up to ninety-
nine percent accuracy on Caucasian men. The software has a much harder time recognizing and 
matching individuals with darker skin and women, being accurate only “up to nearly 35 percent 
for images of darker skinned women” (Lohr, 2018). The problem could lie in the images used as 
training data for the software.  
Using facial recognition software, computers can learn how to recognize a face based on 
data that they are fed (Buolamwini, 2016). The computer learns from the images used as training 
data what traits faces have such as eyes and a nose. This can also mean that a computer can 
become accustomed to certain features and skin tones if that is the only set of inputs it receives in 
its training data to the point of not recognizing a face that is made up of features that are different 
from what it has learned is a “normal” face. This is why a relation between the algorithm’s 
accuracy also has been shown to correlate to whether it is matching a face of the same 
demographic as the majority of the location where it was developed (Phillips, Jiang, Narvekar, 
Ayyad & Otoole, 2010) By adding in more culturally diverse faces to training data, the accuracy 
of facial recognition software may improve.  
Improving the accuracy of facial recognition software is an important step towards the 
software becoming a viable option for United States law enforcement to consider. It would not, 
however, be the only hurdle to get past. Even if facial recognition software were accurate across 
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all races and genders, there would still remain the question of how the software is being used by 
law enforcement. Once accurate, the technology has the potential to be used to target these same 
groups that it currently cannot accurately match. If facial recognition can be used on racial 
minorities it could be used as a means to track racial minorities. If police are allowed to use 
facial recognition software to surveil individuals attending protests or frequenting suspicious 
areas, what is to stop them from surveilling individuals of a racial minority and the neighborhood 
they live in? It is important that we are aware of the consequences of any use of facial 
recognition software by law enforcement as any of the ways we allow the technology to be used 
may have an impact on citizens privacy and personal rights.  
Law Enforcement’s Take 
 No matter where you look, law enforcement generally views “facial recognition 
technology [as] an important tool in solving crime, increasing public safety, and bringing justice 
for victims” ("NYPD Announces Facial Recognition Policy", 2020). This is apparent not only in 
cities where facial recognition software is used by police, but also in cities where it is banned. 
After Cambridge banned facial recognition software, state police spokesman David Procopio 
spoke about the values of facial recognition software as an investigative tool (Geller, 2020)/  
Despite the technology’s flaws and potential for misuse, law enforcement seems to 
believe that the benefits are worth the risk. In San Francisco officers worry that a ban will 
prevent law enforcement from ever using the technology, even with legislature and oversight 
conducting their use of the technology (Metz, 2019). In cities where law enforcement has a 
policy for the use of facial recognition software, officials feel that the technology can do no 
harm. In a March 2020 press release, the New York City Police Department stressed that “A 
facial recognition match is merely a lead; it is not probable cause” (“NYPD Announces Facial 
Law Enforcement’s Use of Facial Recognition Software 27 
Recognition Policy”, 2020). This idea is not unique to New York either. The language of 
Detroit’s policy for the use of facial recognition software uses similar language, stating that “the 
result of a facial recognition search is provided by the Detroit Police Department only as an 
investigative lead and IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF 
ANY SUBJECT” (Detroit Police Department Manual. 2020).  
 These passages are intended to address the public’s concerns with the accuracy of the 
software. If an individual asks about the repercussions of a false positive match and its potential 
to lead to the arrest of an innocent individual, the department can point to this clause and 
reaffirm that facial recognition matches are only used as leads not deciding factors in arrest. 
While this is better than using facial recognition without any such restrictions, it still doesn’t 
fully address or solve the racial bias issue with facial recognition software. By using a piece of 
technology knowing that it has a flaw in the form of racial bias, law enforcement sends the 
message to the tech industry developing facial recognition technology that this is not a fatal flaw. 
In other words, the developers do not need to prioritize this issue because the company can still 
sell the product, facial recognition software, in its current form. This behavior could impede the 
speed at which accuracy amongst different demographics is prioritized and improved as facial 
recognition software continues to be developed.  
 Law enforcement’s use of facial recognition software in its current state also can lead to a 
waste of resources on many fronts, even without the added cost to purchase a contract with a 
facial recognition development company and maintain the software overtime. Funding will also 
need to be allocated to training individuals to use the technology, and if a separate division will 
be created strictly for running facial recognition scans this department must be staffed and 
trained. Resources also would go towards time spent reviewing each request to use the software 
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as well as to review and verify the results. Further, a false positive might lead investigators down 
the wrong path, wasting precious time and resources to follow up a lead that proves to be invalid 
and fruitless.  
 Even with these precautions, a false positive match may indirectly lead to the arrest of an 
innocent individual, though the intention was not to do so. In Detroit, a man was arrested and 
held in jail overnight after a facial recognition search returned his person as a match to a suspect 
in a larceny investigation (Hill 2020). This account is proof that, even with the intention of using 
facial recognition matches as a lead, it is possible for police to be led astray by a false match. 
This opens up the department to liability and gives the impression to citizens that law 
enforcement trusts an algorithm more than their own investigative skills. When the man in 
question held up the surveillance camera image that had been deemed a match for his face it was 
clear that the two were not the same individual. In the time since this story was printed in The 
New York Times, the county prosecutor has commented saying that he “could have the case and 
his fingerprint data expunged” from the record (Hill 2020). If police continue to use facial 
recognition software with its current racial bias, this incident is sure to become a pattern.  
 Another issue with law enforcement’s use of facial recognition software is a lack of 
government policy to regulate the extent of law enforcement’s access and ability to use the 
technology. New York and Detroit do have policies in place, but not at the state or local 
government level. The policies in place are, in fact, police department policies put in place by the 
commissioners of the city’s police department. This allows for a greater level of discretion on the 
part of law enforcement. Police department policies make up a set of protocols for officers to 
follow. Having policies in place not only makes it easier for officers to know what the correct 
decision should be when they are under pressure, they also protect the department from lawsuits 
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by clearly outlining proper procedures ("Four Crucial Law Enforcement Policies", 2020). Law 
enforcement policies can change overtime as new officials are elected or promoted, effectively 
rewriting the interpretations of an individual’s rights and the extent of personal privacies.  
Legislation & Privacy Concerns 
As technology grows and expands along with our society, new advancements often walk 
a thin line between helping us and encroaching upon our individual rights and liberties. Facial 
recognition software is a clear example of this. The potential for the software to do great things, 
once perfected, ranges from aiding in criminal investigation to predicting whether a person is ill. 
These benefits also come with an enormous responsibility for us as a democratic country. In 
order to protect individual rights, specific language must be carefully developed in our policies 
and laws to limit the freedom of the use of these technological advances in order to increase the 
freedom of American citizens.  
Local bans on facial recognition are a start when it comes to preventing the unregulated 
use of imperfect software, but they are only temporary fixes to a larger issue. It is important that 
we develop legislature to tell us how often facial recognition can be used, under what 
circumstances and in what settings. Today there are cameras in most stores, apartment buildings, 
and schools and even built into many streetlights as traffic cameras. A question that has not been 
discussed at length in the forefront of any prior research, is whether law enforcement should be 
able to access these public spaces through the application of facial recognition software on the 
recordings of a public space. If public spaces may be used in this way, there is a potential to 
track individuals throughout their day whether they are in public spaces or not.  
Creating clear policies about when the use of facial recognition software is permissible 
lessens the potential for human error to interfere. Without any restrictions law enforcement is 
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expected to make decisions about when and where facial recognition scans might be useful and 
ethical. Proposed laws like the Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act could lessen the 
demands and pressure put on officers and police departments to decide, in a case-by-case way, 
whether facial recognition will infringe upon citizens’ rights. Instead, there would be a clearly 
outlined protocol to detail when and how officers may seek the use of facial recognition 
software. Local bans will “press pause on face surveillance,” but they also put a pause on the 
development and improvement of facial recognition software as well as halt any attempt for city 
and state governments to begin the process of creating legislature around facial recognition 
(ACLU 2020). 
The Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act also would not solve all of the problems 
facing law enforcement’s use of facial recognition software. The language of the bill proposing 
the Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act is specific to federal law enforcement. This may 
create a precedent for states to follow, however, discretion will still be given to individual states 
when following or choosing not to support this ideal. The bill also only seeks to protect 
individuals from “ongoing surveillance” and stipulates that it does not seek to limit “instances 
where facial recognition technology is utilized for a single identification or attempted 
identification of an individual” as long as the technology is not used to track the individual’s 
movement after being identified (Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act of 2019). Due to 
these exceptions the Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act does not address the issue of 
false identifications due to racial bias or the kinds of databases or systems that officers should be 
allowed to search for a match.  
 Even the very nature of associating facial recognition with the requirement of a warrant 
for surveillance should call into question every other aspect of the technology’s use as well. For 
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law enforcement to use a tool that can be used in such a multitude of ways, from searching 
through a database of mug shots to tracking an individual in real time, it should be considered 
that there is a potential for it to be misused. While law enforcement officials repeatedly assure 
the public that identification of a suspect through the use of a facial recognition scan will only be 
treated as a lead not probable cause for arrest, we have seen examples to the contrary. In the case 
of the Detroit man who was arrested and held overnight the basis of the arrest seemed to revolve 
around a computer program stating falsely that his face was a 99.9% match for the stranger 
caught on tape committing a crime (Hill 2020). 
Moving Forward 
Reviewing the compilation of case studies, both of cities that use or have banned law 
enforcement’s use of facial recognition software, it is clear that certain patterns arise. Law 
enforcement’s general attitude towards facial recognition software is hopeful. City law 
enforcement officers in cities across the country believe that facial recognition software could be 
a valuable tool to aid in investigations. Whether you’re looking at a city like Detroit that uses 
facial recognition, or Somerville which wants very little to do with the technology at this stage, 
the public’s opinion of facial recognition software seems to be aligned. Concerns about the 
software’s accuracy and ability to wrongfully accuse innocent individuals in police investigations 
are widespread.  
Privacy concerns also exist due to a lack of regulation or restriction of law enforcement’s 
use of facial recognition software. As seen throughout the case studies, facial recognition 
software has the potential to be used in many different ways from identifying an individual to 
surveilling them. Because of this malleable potential, it is possible that the software could be 
used in ways that overstep or infringe upon some of our basic constitutional rights. These rights 
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are foundational not only to us as citizens of the United States, but also to our country as a 
democracy. It is important that the many potential uses of facial recognition are considered as 
laws and policies are developed. Proposed laws like the Facial Recognition Technology Warrant 
Act seek to limit the duration of law enforcement’s use of the technology in each individual 
investigation, they do not account for they kinds of ways law enforcement may use the 
technology. It is important to limit the extent of specific applications of the technology such as 
extended surveillance, however, it is also important to consider which applications of the 
technology are to be permitted. Can law enforcement run facial recognition scans in public 
places? Should they be able to apply the technology to protests to identify individual protestors? 
Questions like these much be explored further before we can accurately codify any proper usage 
of facial recognition software by law enforcement.  
In order for facial recognition software to be more viable for use by law enforcement in 
the United States we would first need to make a few changes to the things we prioritize. First, the 
technology must be further developed and tested more extensively. In order to be a useful tool 
for law enforcement, facial recognition technologies’ racial bias needs to be addressed. There is 
no sense in using a tool that is accurate sometimes for some people, and drastically targets 
minority groups when it falls short. Furthermore, cities currently using facial recognition 
software in police investigations should cease using the technology until such a time when 
testing under various circumstances consistently shows accurate results in matching a diverse 
cultural demographic of faces.  
Finally, and most importantly, cities, states and the country as a whole need to begin to 
talk more about privacy rights in a world of technology that easily can break down barriers that 
our country’s founders could never have imagined. Until we have proper legislature detailing 
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how facial recognition software can be used without disregarding or overstepping the bounds of 
our fundamental rights, using it can only bring more division. Even in a future where facial 
recognition software can accurately and reliably identify and match faces of all races, it is 
paramount that restrictions are placed upon law enforcement’s use of the technology. Even if 
facial recognition software was entirely accurate law enforcement would still have the potential 
to abuse it. Facial recognition software that can positively match the faces of minority groups, 
could also be used to track these individuals in the same way that police could track protestors.  
Facial recognition software is a relatively new technological development. As such, it is 
something that should be watched and considered as it is further developed, and its usage 
becomes more widespread. Facial recognition software may be a powerful tool in many 
industries, but as it is by nature a technology that relies upon cameras, images, and recordings it 
is important to consider when, where, and how we will allow this technology to be utilized. Law 
enforcement officers are ideally the guardians and protectors of our country, but they are also 
human. This fact may be overlooked when new technologies are considered as tools for law 
enforcement. If all officers are entirely unbiased, unflawed, and never put in a spot where every 
choice has dramatic consequences, they might be allowed a greater arsenal of technological 
tools. The reality is, however, that officers of the law are still human. As such, it is highly 
probable that some are biased, some seek to abuse the system that gives them power, and some 
simply have different values and morals that deem their actions as honorable when others will 
see them as invasive.  
Because law enforcement is built upon the premise of protecting and serving the public 
but composed of human actors, the rules and restrictions we place on it as an institution are the 
only thing that can narrow this chance for abuse and misuse of technological resources such as 
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facial recognition software. The more rules and restrictions we create to outline the allowed use 
of facial recognition software, the less choices about its appropriate use are left up to individual 
states, cities, precincts and individuals. Facial recognition software may be a viable tool for law 
enforcement, or it may be an unnecessary power with a potential for abuse. It is through these 
guiding restrictions that we may decide what the proper course of action is for our country in this 




Table 1. U.S. Cities Using Facial Recognition Software 
 Salt Lake City New York Detroit 
Year Adopted 2008 2011 2017 
Use driver’s license database Arrest & parole database Public scans previously, 
then through request 
Public Opinion citizens placed in lineup Misuse & inaccuracy Ongoing protests 
Law/Policy none Police Policy Police Policy 
 
Table 2. U.S. Cities Banning Facial Recognition Software 
 Somerville Cambridge San Francisco 
Year Banned 2019 2020 2019 
Ban No use by city of law 
enforcement officials 
No use by city 
departments 
No use by law 
enforcement or city 
officials, future use needs 
city council approval 
Public Opinion awareness leads to 
caution 
F.R.S. misuse elsewhere 
leads to caution 




Investigation will be 
impeded 
Not suspected, but not 
taking a chance 
May never be able to use 
technology in the future 
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